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No. 40,312.

In the Supreme Court of Ohio
APPEAL FROM
THE CoURT' OF APPEALS OF CUYAHOGA CouNTY, OHIO.

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN W. TERRY, and
RICHARD D. CHILTON,

Defendants-Appellants.
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FILED AS OF RIGHT.

Now comes the appellee herein and moves this Court
for an order dismissing the appeal as of right filed by the
appellant, for the reason that no debatable constitutional
question is involved in this case.
JOHN

T.

CORRIGAN,

Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County,
M. PAYNE
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Attorneys for Appellee.

REUBEN

2

Notice of Motion.
The appellants herein will take notice that appellee is
filing in the Supreme Court of Ohio a motion to dismiss
the appeal as of right by the appellants, a copy of which
motion to dismiss is hereto attached, and that said motion
to dismiss will be heard by the Supreme Court along with
the motion for leave to appeal.
JOHN

T.

CORRIGAN,

Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County,
M. PAYNE
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Attorneys for Appellee.

REUBEN

No. 40,312.

In the Supreme Court of Ohio
APPEAL FROM
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO.

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN W. TERRY, and
RICHARD D. CHILTON,

Defendants-Appellants.
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING JURISDICTION.
1. The appellate court has not decided any question
in a way not in accordance with applicable decisions.
2. The appellee moves that the motions for leave to
appeal be dismissed.
3. The judgment of the Court of Appeals rests on an
adequate non-constitutional basis.

QUESTION OF LAW.
The question of law presented by the appellant is
taken out of context and infers a distorted impression of
THE true and correct facts of record.
The only question involved is whether the Court of
Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's overruling of appellant's motion to suppress and defendants'
judgment of conviction.
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STATEMENT OF CASE.
Detective Martin McFadden, a member of the Cleveland Police Department for 39 years and 4 months (R. 11)
and assigned to the Detective Bureau for the past 35 years,
on the 31st day of October, 1963 between 2:20 and 2:30
p.m. while on duty in the Cleveland downtown area at the
intersection of Huron Road, Euclid Avenue and East 13th
Street, observed two men (the defendants in this case).
Upon observing these two men, for the metaphysical reason called a "hunch," the officer decided to position himself in the doorway of Rogo:ff's Store and further observe
them. He continued to do so for some 10 or 12 minutes
and their conduct was this: One would remain at the
corner, the other would walk up Huron Road a short way
and peer into either the Diamond Store or the United Air
Lines office, look up and down the street, return to his
companion, have a short conversation, whereupon his companion would indulge in the same course of conduct while
the first one remained on the corner. This conduct was
repeated two to four times respectively by each of the men
prior to their being joined by a third party. All three
engaged in a short conversation, whereupon the third party
departed and took a position across the street; the two men
resumed their pattern of conduct previously described,
each making four to six trips. Det. McFadden testified, "In
the first place I didn't like their actions on Huron Road,
and I suspected them of casing a job, a stickup, that's the
reason" (R. 42).
The two men then proceeded west on Euclid and at
1120 Euclid they encountered the third male who had
spoken with them previously. All three were standing
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there conversing when Detective McFadden approached,
identified himself as a police officer, asked them their
names. A mumbled, incoherent response was made by one
or all (R. 28). Thereupon the officer took hold of one of
the men, later identified as Terry, turned him around in
front of the officer and facing the other two. He then patted
Terry, the man in front of him. At no time did his hands
reach into any of the men's pockets (R. 29-30). In patting
the defendant Terry, in the upper left pocket of the top
coat the officerfelt a gun (R. 29).
At this time all three men were ordered from the
street to the interior of a nearby store. All were ordered
to place the palms of their hands against the wall. Detective McFadden had the defendant Terry by the collar of his
coat when they reached the interior of the store, and after
ordering them to place their hands upon the wall, pulled
the coat from the shoulder of Terry. A loaded revolver
was exposed in the upper left inside coat pocket and was
removed by Detective McFadden. The officer then proceeded to the defendant Chilton, and in patting on the outside of his clothing, felt an object in the left overcoat pocket
which felt like a gun. He removed the object which turned
out to be a loaded revolver. The third party was patted
in the same manner, no items being found.
All three were conveyed to Central Police Station
and booked under Suspicious Person Warrants.

,.

:,..'
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CHRONOLOGY.
Subsequently, Terry and Chilton were charged with
the offense of carrying concealed weapons and the third
man was released on signing a waiver. Separate indictments were returned on December 18, 1963 against the
two men for carrying concealed weapons. They were
arraigned on December 23, 1963 and entered pleas of not
guilty. Thereafter, on September 22, 1964, counsel for the
defendants filed his motion for suppression of evidence,
claiming illegal search and seizure. The matter came on
for hearing on September 22, 1964, at which time it was
stipulated by counsel for defendants and the state that for
purpose of hearing the motion to suppress, the two cases
be consolidated and it was so ordered by the court. Testimony was then taken.
The trial court on September 22, 1964 in overruling
defendants' motion to suppress and subsequently finding
them guilty on October 2, 1964 of the charge of carrying
concealed weapons, set forth a memorandum opinion.
Thereafter these judgments were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, Eighth Judicial District of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, on May 25, 1966. The Court of Appeals published this opinion in conjunction with the affirmance of
these convictions and the same is reported as State v.
Terry, 5 0. App. 2d 122. These judgments were ordered
into execution May 25, 1966.
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ARGUMENT AND LAW.
Appellee contends:
(1) That the appellants were indicted and convicted
of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, Section
2923.01 of the Ohio Revised Code;
(2) That prior to trial appellants moved the court to
suppress as a product of claimed illegal search and seizure,
certain properties seized, which arrest and seizure the trial
court upheld as being constitutional;
(3) That the court properly denied appellants' motion

to suppress upon hearing of the same;

( 4) That while the question of law presented is one of
public importance, the decision by the Court of Appeals
was correct and should be affirmed.
The trial court, in overruling defendants' motions to
suppress, rendered a memorandum. opinion (Appellants'
Appendix C) in which he expressed the hope that counsel will have the question determined by the appellate
courts.
The issues and the applicable law are so thoroughly
discussed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals ( 5 0. S.
2d 122) (Appellants' Appendix F), that further argument on the points decided is not required in this brief.
Notwithstanding that opinion, defendants erroneously interpret the facts and evidence of record in their argument.
They infer that the arrest was actually made before the
officers frisked the men. They infer that the trial court
found that the arrest was not legal The Court of Appeals,
in dealing with the same erroneous inferences, had this to
say:
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"The appellant contends, however, that in the instant case, despite a right of inquiry, the arrest took
place the moment the defendant was questioned by
the detective. According to his argument, since the
arrest took place at the time of the initial inquiry,
there was at that time no adequate 'reasonable
grounds' to arrest and therefore under the exclusionary rule of Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961),
the evidence must be suppressed. In support of this
the defendant appellant's brief states: 'Since the police
officers in this case did not conduct any interrogation
of the defendant and his companions other than an
inquiry of their names * * * his purpose was to arrest and not to interrogate.'
A principal cause of the difficulty here is the ambiguous nature of the word 'arrest.' Some courts have
used the term 'arrest' to signify the mere act of stopping or restraining a person. But the term 'arrest'
is more commonly used in the technical criminal law
sense as the seizure of an alleged offender to answer
for a crime. Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1093, 1096
(1964); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197
(1964). The cases decided by the United States Supreme
preme Court appear to have adopted this latter usage,
see Carroll vs. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 136
(1925); Brinegar vs. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 163
(1949), and it is the usage that has been adopted by
the courts of Ohio. In 5 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), Arrest, Sec. 3, p. 19, 'arrest' is defined as follows:
'An arrest as the term is used in criminal law signifies the apprehension or detention of the person
of another in order that he may be forthcoming to
answer an alleged or supposed crime.'
Similarly, in State vs. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 268
(1959), this court quoted with approval the following definition of arrest:
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'To constitute an "arrest," four requisites are involved: A purpose to take the person into custody
of the law, under real or pretended authority and
an actual or constructive seizure or detention of
his person, so understood by the personarrested.'
It is readily apparent that a required element of
an arrest is the intent of the officer to arrest. United
States vs. Bonanno, supra, at 81-83. In the instant
case, when the detective approached the defendant,
he had, as shown by uncontradicted testimony, no intention at all to arrest, but only to inquire as to the
defendant's activities. As stated in the record:
'Q. You observed these men for some ten to
twelve minutes?
A. That's right.
Q. You observed the mode of conduct that you
have described to us?
A. That's right.
Q. Did you, sir, as a police officer consider that
you should investigate it?
A. I sure did.

***

Q. * * * after they left the corner and you observed them again in front of * * * (the store
where the three men met) * * * what did you do?
A. I stopped them and went over and talked
to them.'

As to the exact time when the arrest took place,
the record shows:
'Q. Then in this situation you considered them
to be under arrest when you ordered the store people to call for the wagon?
A. That's right.'
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The defendants, however, contend that the case
of Henry vs. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), establishes the point that the arrest in the instant case took
place the moment the defendant was stopped by the
detective. However, in the Henry case, the government conceded in the lower courts, see 259 F. (2d)
725 (7th Cir. 1958), and adhered to the concession
before the Supreme Court, that the 'arrest' occurred
the moment the car in which Henry was riding was
stopped by the federal agents. The Supreme Court in
its opinion stated:
'The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to
that concession here, that the arrest took place
when the federal agents stopped' the car. This is
our view of the facts of this particular case.' 361
U.S. at 103.
When the opinion in Henry is read in light of this
concession, it is apparent that the court was only deciding that, in the circumstances of that case, there
was no probable cause to justify an 'arrest' at the time
the car in which Henry was riding was stopped. See,
United States vs. Bonanno, supra, at p. 85; Busby vs.
United States, supra. Therefore, we hold that, in the
instant case, the actual arrest did not occur until the
defendant was ordered into the store after the loaded
gun was discovered concealed on his person; Cf. Rios
vs. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)."
What the court actually said was that if the arrest had
preceded the frisking of the defendant, such arrest would
then have been illegal. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals both determined that there is a distinction between stopping and frisking and search and seizure and
both the trial and appellate court determined that in this
case the arrest followed and was the result of a frisking
operation and was made upon probable cause.
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Defendants' argument ignores the suspicious conduct
observed by the officers, ignores the officer's testimony of
39 years of police experience, ignores the officer's testimony that in his judgment they were "casing" an establishment for a holdup. The argument ignores the testimony of the officer that he identified himself as a police
officer before asking them questions, it ignores the
mumbled, incoherent response· given by the defendants
when they were asked their names, ignores the frisking
procedure and the officer's testimony that in his judgment they were casing an establishment for a holdup and
he wanted to determine if they had guns, ignores the testimony of the officer that he frisked and felt a hard object,
which object, based on his 39 years of police experience,
heh e concluded was a gun. The argument ignores the fact
that even then, no search or entrance was made into the
pockets of the defendant. The officer, retaining one defendant by the collar and arm, ordered the others inside
the store and commanded them to place their hands on
the wall. The back of the coat collar was then pulled down
to the defendant's arms and there exposed was the object felt by the officer, the gun, as he had so previously
determined based on his 39 years of experience. They
continue to ignore the fact that the possession of the gun
discovered by the frisking operation coupled with the other
conduct observed by the officer prior thereto, furnished
the probable cause for the officer to arrest the man and
consequently the subsequent search was legal. Had the
officer found nothing when he frisked the man, then and
only then would there have been no grounds for the subsequent arrest. It is quite clear, and the facts of the record
are set forth, that the manifest intention of the officer was
to interrogate and not to arrest.
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Defendants' argument of after-the-event justification.
In this connection two points should be noted: defendants have inserted a portion of the testimony from the
record out of context that would appear to infer after-theevent justification. A reading of the entire record and the
:finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
obviously refute such an inference and argument on the
part. of the defendants. The police officer had observed
strange, suspicious conduct of three men, which conduct
led him to believe that a holdup was imminent. A basic
moral obligation as a police officer dictated that he make an
inquiry. Upon doing so he received incoherent, mumbled
responses. The sum total of all that had transpired up to
this point was sufficient probable cause for the officer's
next move of "frisking" for his own protection. Upon his
frisking and feeling the bulge, 39 years of police experience forcedthis officer to conclude that the defendant
was armed and carrying a concealed weapon and thereby
was committing a felony in the presence of the officer. The
aggregate facts and knowledge now possessed by the officer give rise to probable cause for the valid arrest which
followed.
The Court of Appeals has held that such arrest was
a valid arrest and that even if the arrest took place as appellant contends, it does not necessarily follow that this
evidence must be suppressed. The opinion discusses the
reason for the imposition of the Mapp exclusionary rule
upon the States and the necessity for developing workable
able rules" governing arrests, searches and seizures, to
meet the practicable demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement, provided these rules do not
violate the constitutional proscriptions against unreason-
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able searches and the concomitant command that evidence
so seized is inadmissible against one who is standing to
complain. The opinion wisely concludes that the necessity of law enforcement in large urban areas requires the
procedures utilized in the instant case.
Finally, defendant labels the distinction between a
frisk and a search as contained in the opinions of the trial
and appellate court as "semantic gymnastics," and again
attempts to equate a search which produces narcotics or
policy slips with a frisk for a dangerous weapon. Common sense, in the interest of society, repels such a conclusion.
"The business of the police is to prevent· crime if
they can. Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual
street action is an indispensable police power in the
orderly government of large urban communities. It is
a prime function of city police to be alert to things
going wrong in the streets; if they were to be denied
the right of such summary inquiry, a normal power
and a necessary duty would be closed off."
People v. Rivera (7 (7/10/64, N. Y. Court of Appeals, U.S. Law Week, July 28, Vol. 33 #4.)
At this point the distinction made by the trial court
comes into this case. The decisions in White v. U. S., 271
F. 2d 829 (1959) ; U. S. v. Hahmn, 163 F. Supp. 4 (1958),
and the decision in the Mapp case will not outlaw a state
officer's frisking or even a search of the person made
prior to arrest. Under the Uniform Arrest Act adopted
with modifications in Delaware, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island, "the police officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he has stopped or detained
to question as provided in Section 2. Whenever he has

14
reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the
person possesses a dangerous weapon, if the officer finds a
weapon he may take and keep it until the completion of
the questioning when he shall either return it or arrest
the person." The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. Law Review 315 at 344 (1942). If we recognize the authority of
the police to stop a person and inquire concerning unusual
street events we are required to recognize the hazards involved in this kind of public duty. The answer to the
question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet;
in any case, the exposure to danger could be great. The
frisk is a reasonable and constitutionally permissible precaution to minimize that danger. We ought not, in deciding
what is reasonable, close our eyes to the actualities of
street dangers in performing this kind of public duty for
the protection of society.

CONCLUSION.
The trial court properly found that there is a distinction between a frisk and a search, and that in the circumstances of this case the frisk preceded the arrest, and
further, that the arrest and search in connection therewith were legal. The opinion of the Court of Appeals and
the authorities cited therein support that conclusion. The
defendant has not shown any valid reason why these findings should be disturbed. The motion for leave to appeal
should therefore be overruled.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN T. CORRIGAN,
Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County,
REUBEN M. PAYNE,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Attorneys for Appellee.

